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Identifying Potential Terrorists: Visuality, Security and the Channel 
Project 
 
This paper analyses how British counter-radicalisation policy, and the Channel project in 
particular, constitutes individuals who are vulnerable to radicalisation as visible, producing 
them as subjects of intervention. It thus asks, how can potential terrorists be identified and 
made knowable? The paper first argues that to understand Channel, it is crucial to develop a 
conceptual account of the security politics of (in)visibilisation that draws attention to the ways 
in which security regimes can, at times, function primarily through the production of regimes 
of (in)visibility. Utilising this approach, the paper focusses on the role of ‘indicators’ as a 
technology of (in)visibilisation, producing certain subjects as newly visibilised as threatening: 
a role that is central to the functioning of Channel. Yet such a production is political. In 
bringing together a politics of care and a politics of identity, it is a regime of (in)visibility that 
produces new sites of intervention, contains significant potential consequences for the 
expression of certain identities, and raises new and troubling possibilities for how 
contemporary life may be secured. 
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Introduction 
 
Since the early 2000s, and especially since the bombings of July 7th 2005, there has been a 
keen interest in the problem of radicalisation within the UK: the problem of how some 
individuals come to be involved in ’extremist’ political violence. The question of how the UK 
might prevent these processes of becoming violent has come to occupy a central place 
within political and media discourse. How can individuals at risk of becoming involved in 
terrorism be identified? How can this potential be made visible? At the cutting-edge of 
global counter-radicalisation practice, the UK represents a crucial site in the institutional 
response to these questions. ‘Prevent’, one of the four pillars of the UK’s counter-terrorism 
strategy, CONTEST, represents the institutional space in which these problems are tackled. 
With the ongoing, if not increased, threat from violent extremism, and the small yet very 
visible number of British citizens seeking involvement in political violence, these concerns 
are unlikely to abate soon.  
 
Within the academic literature, there has been an increasing interest in Prevent and how it 
seeks to conceptualise and intervene into processes of radicalisation (Schmid, 2013; de 
Goede and Simon, 2013; Heath-Kelly, 2013; Martin, 2014a,b; Mythen et al., 2017, Kundnani, 
2014). Intimately related is a concern with how Muslim communities are policed within the 
context of the war on terror (Kundnani, 2007, 2014; Thomas, 2012; Kapoor, 2013; 
Communities and Local Government Committee, 2010; O’Toole et al., 2016; Ragazzi, 2016). 
Yet there has been little attention paid to the specific mechanisms through which the 
individuals of Prevent’s ambitions – those ‘vulnerable’ to radicalisation – come to be 
constituted as identifiable, visible manifestations of threat, which are then subject to 
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intervention (although see Mythen et al., 2017). Sitting at the intersection of security, 
temporality, visibility and care, this paper explores the institutional space that produces 
these processes of becoming violent as knowable and visible: Channel. 
 
The ‘Channel’ process is the mechanism through which ‘vulnerabilities to radicalisation’ are 
reported and, if deemed necessary, where interventions to manage such vulnerabilities are 
formulated. The central argument of this paper, is that the Channel process cannot be 
understood without a reading of the politics of (in)visibility through which it functions. 
Taking cues from Deleuze’s reading of Foucault’s oeuvre, the paper situates processes of 
(in)visibilisation as crucial for the production and distribution of the security gaze (Deleuze, 
2006: 3-58). Central to many security practices, it is argued, is the question of how threats 
are produced as identifiable and how this knowledge is trained and communicated as a 
regime of (in)visibility. Not only is this analytical lens essential to reading the politics of the 
Channel process, it thus also foregrounds a wider analysis of the relation between security 
and visuality. This paper, conceptually and empirically, thus seeks to demonstrate how 
those who are understood to be vulnerable to radicalisation are made visible.  
 
This approach coheres with recent developments in critical security methodologies, taking 
seriously Williams’ (2003) provocation that critical security studies needs to pay attention to 
visualities as sites of communicative action. Nevertheless, it is an approach that differs from 
much of the work undertaken within the critical security literature on visuality in that it is 
not concerned with visual artefacts. Following Andersen, Vuori and Mutlu (2015; see also 
Andersen, Vuori and Guillaume, 2015), it is necessary to distinguish between approaches to 
visuality that, on the one hand, are concerned with ‘visual security’ and studying politically 
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meaningful visual artefacts and, on the other, ‘visualities of security’, and knowledge 
practices that constitute what is rendered as visible and what is not. It is the latter with 
which this paper is concerned. In dialogue with recent work within the sociology of visibility 
and critical security studies, the paper develops an account of regimes of (in)visibility as 
distinct, but intimately connected to, discursive regimes. Regimes of (in)visibility, it will be 
argued, can be understood as economies of visibility that produce relations of the gaze, 
governing who sees and who is seen, who is visible and who is not.  
 
Through this analysis, the paper seeks to make two wider contributions. First, it seeks to 
deepen the insights of the emerging literature, exploring, conceptually and empirically, the 
relationship between the discursive and the visible. The paper argues that many of the 
practices with which critical security are concerned rely upon an attempt to translate 
discursive knowledges into visibilised objects or subjects of threat. These can be understood 
as strategies of (in)visibilisation. The paper situates the technology of the ‘indicator’ as a key 
example of such strategies, and also reflects upon the interaction of such strategies and 
discursive knowledges with existent regimes of (in)visibility. Second, the paper argues that it 
is impossible to make sense of Channel without understanding it as a strategy of 
(in)visibilisation. In reading the practices of Channel through this lens, the paper provides an 
account of Prevent which situates it as productive of new subjects of visibility, at the 
intersection of a politics of care and a politics of identity. Contributing to recent work that 
foregrounds the central relation within Prevent between social policy, care and counter-
radicalisation (see Heath-Kelly, 2017a,b; Ragazzi, 2017), Channel is conceptualised as a site 
that seeks to produce a pastoral-security gaze. This paper thus draws attention to the 
practices through which security actors actively seek to produce and inform regimes of 
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(in)visibility, insisting that to secure demands strategies of (in)visibilisation, illuminating 
subjects and objects of threat that thus require mediation.  
 
The paper is comprised of four sections. First, the paper demonstrates the increasing 
centrality of Prevent, and, specifically, the Channel project, within British security practice.. 
Second, the paper develops a conceptual account of strategies of (in)visibilisation, arguing 
that central to many security practices is the need to produce subjects and objects of threat 
as visible. The third section discusses the role of the ‘indicator’ as a specific technology of 
(in)visibilisation. It demonstrates that Channel functions through the articulation of 
‘vulnerability indicators’, which seek to train the professional gaze, directing it towards 
newly visibilised subjects. The fourth section draws out the substantive politics of this 
regime of (in)visibility. It argues that, contrary to how the strategy presents itself, such 
practices are imbued with an identity politics that visibilises some and invisibilises others, 
primarily visibilising those who are perceived as, or would identify as, Muslim. Yet, at the 
intersection of care and identity, it is also productive of new lines of sight, integrating the 
pastoral gaze with questions of security and identity to illuminate novel subjects of threat. 
The article concludes by reflecting on the consequences of this analysis of Prevent, arguing 
that when read as a strategy of (in)visibilisation, it can be interpreted as at the forefront of 
visibilising life itself as a process of (potentially dangerous) becoming. It is the frontline of a 
profound merging of a politics of care and a politics of identity, enabling new subjects and 
objects of risk to be identified, and with significant implications for our understanding of 
how contemporary life is to be secured. 
 
Prevent and the Channel Programme 
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Prevent, the United Kingdom’s counter-radicalisation strategy, forms one of the four pillars 
of CONTEST, the UK Government’s overarching counter-terrorism strategy drawn-up in 
response to the attacks of 9/11. First presented to Cabinet in 2003 (Omand, 2010: 86), the 
strategy was published in 2006 and significantly reiterated in 2009 and 2011 (Home Office, 
2006; 2009; 2011a). During this evolution, the Prevent pillar has grown in relative 
importance, meriting a significant update in 2007 and a separate, extensive policy document 
in 2011 (DCLG, 2007; Home Office, 2011b). Central to Prevent is the ambition of ‘tackling 
the radicalisation of individuals’ (Home Office, 2006: 9), an ambition that manifests most 
clearly in the Channel project. Channel was initially introduced as a pilot programme in April 
2007, operative in twelve police forces representing localities understood to be at particular 
risk, before being rolled out nationally in April 2012. With the passing of the Counter-
Terrorism and Security Act 2015, it is now a statutory duty for a number of specified 
authorities, including local government, prisons and probation services, education and child 
care, health and social care and the police.  
 
The active work carried out by Channel consists of three principle tasks: to identify 
individuals at risk from violent extremism; to assess the nature and extent of the risk; and, if 
considered suitable for a Channel intervention, to develop the most appropriate support for 
the individual concerned (Home Office, 2010: 7). This process is managed by a multi-agency 
panel consisting of relevant professions. Any referral is first screened and, if considered 
appropriate, the panel will then assess whether the individual is vulnerable to violent 
extremism (Home Office, 2010; 2012). If accepted onto the Channel programme, a support 
package will be tailor made by a multi-agency panel depending on the needs of the 
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individual. The guidance suggests that for someone in the ‘early stages’ of radicalisation, a 
‘diversionary activity’ may be sufficient, whereas someone who was ‘already radicalised’ 
might require a ‘more focussed and structured one-on-one mentoring programme’ (Home 
Office, 2012: 20). Progress is reviewed at least every three months, and the intervention is 
considered to have achieved its aims when the panel is satisfied that the risks have been 
successfully reduced or managed.  
 
As the Channel project has been extended, the numbers of referrals have risen year on year. 
Latest figures from the Home Office (2017: 4) show that for the year 2015/16, 7,631 
referrals were made to the Channel process. This contrasts with a sum total of 3,934 
referrals made during the seven years from the beginning of the programme in 2007 to 
March 31st, 2014 (NPCC, no date). It is reasonable to assume this increase is, in part, due to 
Channel now being a statutory duty, with, in the 2015/16 reporting year, schools referring 
the most cases by sector (33%) followed by the police (31%) local authorities (11%) and the 
health sector (6%). In the 2015/16 recording year, 65% of referrals were for ‘Islamist 
extremism’ and 10% were for ‘right-wing’ extremism (although 1,173 referrals were 
unspecified in this regard). For 2015/16, only 5% of referrals resulted in a Channel 
intervention (compared to 20% for the programme until March 2014 (NPCC, no date)). 
Channel thus represents a significant and increasingly important mechanism within the 
contemporary British security apparatus. A considerable number of individuals are referred 
each year, and it is an important aspect of the professional life of many. Yet it also raises key 
questions. How is this potential to violent extremism identified such that it can be referred? 
And why are there so many false positives at the referral stage?  
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Politics of (In)Visibility and Strategies of (In)Visibilisation 
 
The question at the heart of the Channel programme could be summarised as follows: how 
can potential terrorists be made visible, prior to their becoming a terrorist? In order to fully 
and critically engage with this question, it is therefore necessary to provide a theoretical and 
methodological account of the temporality and visualities of identifying threats. The 
argument of this section is that all acts of security require the mediation and disciplining of 
an uncertain future. To secure, therefore, requires the crossing of a temporal gap, the space 
between the present and the conceptualisation of a threat to come. This in turn requires 
discursive and institutional mechanisms that make such a traversal legible and actionable, 
and in the specific context of Channel, produce those who are ‘vulnerable to radicalisation’ 
as visible. The problematic of Channel thus speaks to wider processes and practices of 
security. Whether the object of concern is potential terrorists, projected migration flows or 
the complex security implications of climate change, to secure requires the identification of 
that which is considered threatening.  
 
Foregrounding the analytical centrality of ‘visibility’ first requires an account of the relation 
between security and temporality. A good starting point is a distinction drawn by Massumi 
(2013) between dangers and threats. Dangers, in this reading, represent an immediacy and 
localisability of harm. The harm exists in the future, but there is a linear and observable line 
between the present and the future harm. It is a harm that is therefore clear and present. 
Threat, on the other hand, exists in a futurial space that cannot be related to the present 
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along linear pathways. It exists primarily as an affect; it is, for Massumi (2013) something 
that is felt and intuited. There is a gap between the present and the harm that is said and 
felt to come. Threat is thus ontologically characterised by an inherent and unresolvable 
uncertainty. Yet, it is deemed, the harms such threats contain cannot be allowed to occur 
(see for instance Anderson, 2010). Thus, to secure – and here it is possible to locate the 
central problematic of security – is to cross this uncertain futurial gap. Yet doing so requires 
work. Unlike with dangers, the central task is first to make the threatened harm knowable, 
legible and thus actionable.1 This work is not neutral. Rather, the mechanisms constructed 
and deployed to cross this gap are constitutive of the nature of the threat and the possible 
mediations these allow. Whilst the futures with which security actors might be concerned is 
limitless, their actual constitution will necessarily be partial – conceptualising and visualising 
only a portion of actual potential futures that will be culturally and epistemically limited (de 
Goede, 2008). Every act of securing is thus a performative traversal that structures its own 
political terrain.  
 
Practices of security can, therefore, be understood as a function of distributing intelligibility 
of threat in the present. While not the only mechanism through which security functions, 
central to many security practices is the identification of individuals who are deemed 
threatening (for the future) on account of their actions (in the present). At the heart of this 
process is thus the question of security visualities; the processes of making visible the traces 
the future leaves in the present. To highlight this aspect of security practice, the paper now 
                                                          
1 Recent scholarship has started to foreground the numerous ways in which security rationalities seek to disclose 
and then act upon an uncertain future, encompassing, but by no means limited to, the use of imagination (van 
Munster and Sylvest 2014), conjecture (Aradau and van Munster (2011), scenario planning (Collier and Lackoff, 
2008) and emergency response preparation (Anderson and Adey, 2012). 
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turns to Deleuze’s (2006) reading of Foucault, wherein he identifies two overlapping, yet 
nevertheless distinct, operations of knowledge. The first, and by far the most utilised in 
contemporary analysis, is the system of language established by the statement. The second, 
is that of the ‘visible’, which, in Deleuze’s language, operates as a system of light (Deleuze, 
2006: 28). Narrating his use of these terms within The Archaeology of Knowledge, Deleuze 
shows how Foucault erects a sphere of that which can be said and articulated and, as a 
separate albeit co-emergent sphere of knowledge, a sphere of that which can be seen and 
sensed, and cannot be reduced to utterances (Deleuze, 2006: 27). Deleuze, in tracing the 
evolution of Foucault’s thought, argues that this conception of the ‘non-discursive’ attains 
its moment of positivity in Discipline and Punish, particularly through the description of the 
prison. 
 
The example of the panopticon is central, and has endured, as it provides an expression of 
this realm of the visible unto itself. The prison, as Deleuze (2006: 28) relates, represented a 
novel way of acting upon bodies and could not be reduced to the system of language that 
constitutes penal law. Penal law was concerned with that aspect of the criminal that could 
be articulated, namely classifications of offences and sentences. The prison, as an 
environment, inscribed lines and systems of visibility within a discrete architecture, 
structuring lines of sight that are themselves productive of a series of visibilities (Deleuze, 
2006: 28):  
Each individual, in his place, is securely confined to a cell from which he is seen from 
the front by the supervisor; but the side walls prevent him from coming into contact 
with his companions. He is seen, but he does not see; he is the object of information, 
never a subject in communication (Foucault, 1995: 200). 
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The panopticon, for Deleuze, thus functions as an architecture that distributes the gaze. The 
play of luminosity – of light and of shadow – is itself productive of the way that social reality 
is seen and interpreted. The guard sees without being seen. The prisoner is seen but cannot 
see. And it is this gaze, constituted by its environment, that produces a whole array of 
subjectivations and power relations. The prison was a ‘system of light before being a figure 
of stone’ (Deleuze, 2006: 28).  
 
Deleuze’s reading of Foucault reasserts the independence and importance of the visible as a 
distinct sphere of social relations, capable of producing objects and subjects of knowledge, 
and relations of power. A sphere intimately linked, yet distinct from, the often more 
privileged realms of the sayable. While developing crucial insights in relation to visibility and 
disciplinary power, Foucault nevertheless failed to extend these to other sites of social 
relations (Tazzioli and Walters, 2016). Within the panoptic diagram, seeing and being seen 
is, as Tazzioli and Walters (2016: 448-449) identify, a unidirectional activity with a clear 
division of who sees and who is seen. Within other social sites, the distribution of seeing and 
being seen is plural and multifaceted. Yet, the utility of the panoptic diagram is that through 
it, the specificity of the visible emerges. Whereas the statement is defined by language, 
regimes of visibility are defined by the gaze, and the given structuring and distribution of the 
gaze within a space of social relations.  
 
In this context, three qualities of the visible can be identified, that, taken together, can be 
understood as constitutive of specific regimes of (in)visibility. First, the production of 
objects, subjects and processes as sites of knowledge that are visibly perceptible. To see, in 
this context is not, however, a pure process of representation. Visuality is a certain form of 
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practice, a complex process of integration, in which a whole assemblage of sensed data is 
brought together to build a coherent representation of a subject or object (Mirzoeff, 2011: 
474). It is in short, a visualisation. As Mirzoeff (2011: 474) argues, enacting visuality ‘must be 
imaginary, rather than perceptual, because what is being visualized is too substantial for any 
one person to see and is created from information, images, and ideas’. Amoore (2009: 22-
23), discussing a slightly different context of technology-driven algorithmic security 
processes, draws attention to the way in which disparate data points are combined in order 
to visualise an image of the potentially threatening individual. It is in this process of 
integration that the image of the subject of future threat can be produced as a coherent 
representation that is amenable to visibilisation. To see is never to see without mediation, 
and it is regimes of visibility that provide the integrative possibilities available in a particular 
site of social relations.  
 
Second, a regime of visibility will distribute the gaze – who sees and who is seen? What is 
worth seeing? Who has the authority to define and integrate certain subjects and objects as 
visible? Providing a post-colonial reading of security visualities, Dixit (2014: 339) rightly 
identifies that ways of looking have always been relational, and, within a history of 
coloniality, have been a central way in which the ‘we’ (often white, Western males) make 
sense of ‘them’ (usually bodies of colour), a gaze which is intimately related to productions 
of threat and danger. Nevertheless, the gaze should not be reduced to relations of control 
or coercion. As Brighenti (2007: 339) argues, regimes of visibility are also defined by their 
‘style’. Thus, he argues, while the control-type is clear within the panopticon, the social-type 
of gaze might be mobilised around the demand for recognition – the demand to be seen – 
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to structure the gaze to recognise previously invisibilised minority groups. Thus, the visible 
emerges as both a relational field, governing who sees and who is seen within a given social 
site, and a site of knowledge, determining what is seen, and what such sites of visibility 
mean. Following Brighenti (2007: 324), the social category of visibility can be situated at the 
intersection of aesthetics (relations of perception) and politics (relations of power).2 
 
Third, as regimes of visibility are constituted by the gaze, all acts of viewing are partial and 
constrained. To view takes time, processing and cognition – attention is not limitless, and 
will thus only focus on certain sites. Following Amoore (2009: 19-20), regimes of (in)visibility 
are therefore also economies of attentiveness, apportioning and segregating the world into 
that which is worthy of attention and that which is not. In a context of security, it is assumed 
that security actors will thus (at least ideally) pay attention to those subjects and objects 
that are made visible due to being imbued with threat. Regimes of (in)visibility thus function 
as economies within which certain sites are more and less visible.  
 
Yet, while this foregrounds the constitutive importance of the visible, in positing this 
distinction between the discursive and the visible, what emerges as analytically central is 
the question of their relation. Crucially, in seeking to understand security regimes that, in 
traversing the temporal gap, must actively produce knowledge of the future threat that is to 
be secured, these contexts are not often those of the visible unto itself that is represented 
by the panopticon. Instead, they require translation between the sayable and the visible. 
Brighenti reads Foucault’s distinction between the sayable and the visible as redolent of a 
                                                          
2 This way of conceiving of the visual bears marked similarities to the work of Rancière and his understanding 
that political regimes are always also aesthetic regimes (Rancière, 2004: 12-13; 1999: 57-58). 
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modernist privileging of the discursive over the ocular. He regards Foucault’s reading of 
power as ‘sensorially deprived’, wherein his analysis of images is only mobilised to ‘claim the 
priority of discourse over a visible which remains wholly heterogeneous and can never be 
entirely reduced to it’ (Brighenti, 2010: 12). A more sympathetic reading of Foucault’s 
oeuvre might situate the significance of the visible in Foucault’s work differently. While 
Brighenti is right to highlight that for Foucault, the discursive often takes centre stage, this 
need not be read as a value judgement, but can be framed as a methodological and 
analytical move. What emerges across much of Foucault’s work is a concern with how 
discursive knowledges and practices are mobilised through the production of new sites of 
visibility. Thus, one of the common threads within his work is the identification of a 
particular site of visibility that, in being made visible, is produced as a subject or object 
which can then be mediated. The madman, the vagrant, flows of population. All are 
produced through regimes of discursive knowledge that seek to integrate the problematised 
site as an observable phenomena, and to direct the gaze towards it.  
 
An emerging literature is now negotiating the intersection of security and visuality. Yet, for 
the most part, the concern is with how actors (both ‘powerful’ and not) negotiate positions 
of visibility and invisibility. Both Tazzioli and Walters (2016:879) and de Vries (2016: 879) 
discuss visibility in terms of ‘tactics’ – framing social relations of visibility as a strategic space 
within which subjects negotiate their luminosity. De Vries (2016), for instance, utilises a 
framework of the politics of (in)visibility to narrate how immigrants in Malaysia navigate 
their social visibility, and how, and if, they are seen. She maps a complex regime of 
(in)visibility, and the means through which immigrant subjects negotiate it: 
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the mobility and contingency of these processes – affirming a presence in official 
invisibility; being invisibilised through visibility, or vice versa; reappropriating the 
visibility of being made knowable, etc. – means that refugee subjectivities can be 
strategic, mobile, emergent and shifting, and produced, managed and employed in 
various ways simultaneously’ (de Vries, 2016: 894). 
 
However, while this draws attention to the importance of regimes of (in)visibility in security 
practice, little attention has been paid to the mechanisms through which security actors 
actively seek to produce and inform such regimes. Put differently, what is of concern to this 
paper is the means through which security actors actively seek to shape the perceptions of 
those enacting security, and the regimes of (in)visibility they negotiate on a day-to-day 
basis. Thus, in contrast to the ‘tactics’ of visibility in concrete social relations, it is also 
necessary to talk of the strategies of (in)visibilisation that are pursued by security actors, 
and seek to make visible, and thus potentially manageable, problematised subjects and 
objects. Within a context of security, those responsible for enacting security measures need 
to see that to which they must be vigilant. 
 
At the heart of the security problematic is thus a question of translation between the 
sayable and the visible. Folding back on the earlier discussion of temporality, it is possible to 
ontologise the concept of security as containing two key functions. First, the demand to 
produce the future threat as intelligible, and second, the demand to render the future 
threat as perceptible. While not always the case, it would seem the former is more aligned 
with discourse and the latter with visibility. Central to many security practices is a need for 
discursive security knowledges to be translated into a visible medium, such that security 
actors can visualise and integrate sense data into coherent subjects, objects and processes 
of threat, and in so doing, to train and direct the gaze towards such threats. This is not 
intended to privilege state institutions in their strategies of (in)visibilisation, neither as a 
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sole site of production nor in terms of their impact. Regimes of (in)visibility are manifold and 
contested. Attempts to (in)visibilise certain sites are always in the context of pre-existent 
regimes of knowledge. Such attempts may fail and they may well produce unexpected or 
unintended results. Yet, it is also to ascribe an importance to state security practices, and 
the mechanisms through which they seek to produce and communicate threats. Within the 
problematic of Channel, and the demand to identify potential vulnerability to radicalisation, 
these security practices are central to understanding how the policy seeks to function. It is 
thus to ask: How is the threat of radicalisation produced as a site of knowledge? And how 
are the discourses of radicalisation knowledge mobilised to enable security practitioners to 
identify vulnerability to radicalisation? 
 
The (Vulnerability) Indicator as a Technology of (In)Visibilisation 
 
In the context of Channel, what emerges as central to these processes is the vulnerability 
indicator. The ‘indicator’ can be understood as a key security technology of (in)visibilisation, 
producing, and serving to direct gaze and attentiveness towards, signifiers of threat in the 
present that are deemed to be important. The indicator takes different forms across 
security domains. In the case of Channel, it is indicators of ‘vulnerability to radicalisation’ 
that are central, enabling intervention prior to the actualisation of violence.  
 
The centrality of the indicator emerges due to the relation to the future established by 
radicalisation knowledges. Radicalisation, as an object of knowledge, understands there to 
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be a process or pathway towards violence that can be identified, charted and mediated. In 
other words, that certain actions, behaviours or identifications in the present can be traced 
along a pathway to a potential harm in the future. This articulation of radicalisation, as a 
pathway that can be mapped and identified, allows action upon this process at various 
stages (Heath-Kelly, 2013; de Goede and Simon, 2013). If the guiding metaphor of 
radicalisation is the conveyor belt, taking an individual from passivity to violence, it is 
envisaged that through understanding movement along this path, individuals at risk can be 
made visible prior to manifesting as violent extremists, allowing the conveyor belt to be 
stopped and, potentially, reversed.  
 
Much of the radicalisation literature is concerned with this demand (see, for example, 
Sageman, 2004, 2008 and Wiktorowicz, 2005). It is, however, an epistemological ambition 
that has been challenged, with the argument being that to search for any idea of general 
cause is problematic, and that variables only make sense in relation to specific cases (see, 
for example, Githens-Mazer, 2010; Schmid, 2013). What is lost in this debate, however, are 
the important ways in which such knowledges, and the practices they inform, are 
themselves generative. Read as a strategy of (in)visibilisation, not only does the vulnerability 
indicator discipline radicalisation temporally (as de Goede and Simon (2013), and Heath-
Kelly (2013) rightfully note), it also produces the ‘vulnerable’ subject as a visibilised social 
site. The ‘vulnerability indicator’ as a security technology functions as a mechanism that 
translates discursive ‘knowledges’ of radicalisation into a series of indicators that seek to 
instil and manifest a particular distribution and type of gaze. A whole economy of visibilities 
will be produced that serves to inform the vision of pastoral agents; an economy that 
structures the visibility of those deemed secure and those who require securing. It must, of 
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course, be recognised that this is not a direct and unmediated process. These accounts of 
vulnerability will be interpreted and mediated by those who are tasked with their 
implementation. They may well be contested. Nevertheless, that these accounts of 
vulnerability are privileged by the Home Office and other bodies writing guidance and 
training entails they take centre-stage as a strategy of (in)visibilisation. They thus point 
towards an intent to produce and instil an expertise and economy of the gaze within these 
pastoral professions.  
 
The most conclusive list of vulnerabilities is that found in the most recent Channel Guide, 
first published in 2012, which lists 22 ‘vulnerability indicators’ under the subheadings of 
engagement, intent and capability.3 Taken as a whole it is understood their assessment will 
provide a rounded view of an individual’s vulnerability, informing the decision over whether 
an individual needs support, and, through continued assessment, they can be used to track 
an individual’s progress (Home Office, 2012: 11-12). Engagement can be seen in ‘spending 
increasing time in the company of other suspected extremists’; ‘changing their style of 
dress’; ‘loss of interest in other friends and activities’; and ‘possession of material or 
symbols associated with an extremist cause’. Intention is identified through ‘using insulting 
or derogatory names or labels for another group’; ‘condoning or supporting violence or 
harm towards others’; or ‘plotting or conspiring with others’. And capability can be seen in 
the suspect ‘having a history of violence’ or ‘having occupational skills that can enable acts 
                                                          
3 These indicators derive from a tool called ‘Extremist Risk Guidance 22+’ (ERG22+). ERG22+ was developed, 
without wider consultation, by psychiatrists working for the National Offenders Management Service. The 
original study, which underpins the ERG22+ framework, has never been subjected to external oversight, lacks 
credible peer review and has not been replicated. Nor has the dataset used for the study been publicly released 
(Qureshi, 2016; see also Mythen et al., 2017). 
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of terrorism’ (taken from Home Office, 2012: 12; the full list can also be found from this 
citation). What becomes clear is that there are a series of behaviours, skills and political or 
theological utterances that, whilst in themselves are legal, become newly visibilised, check-
listable indicators of a potential to radicalisation that requires mediation. 
 
This impulse becomes even more evident in the guidance given to those pastoral 
organisations with Channel responsibilities. The most useful documents in this regard are 
those issued by the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO)4 and the Department for 
Children, Schools and Families (DCSF)5 to schools, colleges and universities. While these 
particular guidances, dating from 2008-2012, are from the early Channel rollout, the 
intersection they established between safeguarding and questions of radicalisation was 
crucial, informing Channel practice and training to this day (see, for example, the WRAP 
(Workshop to Raise Awareness of Prevent) training (Home Office, 2014)). These provide 
examples of real life occurrences that are seen by policymakers to be indicative of potential 
future violence, and are thus important for pastoral professionals to be aware of. They 
therefore enable an understanding of the particular visible performances and identifications 
which are, by nature of their perceived threatening potential, in need of mediation.  
 
ACPO’s guidance to schools included a list of ‘vulnerable behaviour identified in schools’. It 
includes: ‘[o]penly anti-Christian, anti-Muslim and anti-Semitic words and behaviour’;  
‘[s]tudents glorifying acts of violent extremism; ‘[a] religious convert who had also joined a 
                                                          
4 The Association of Chief Police Officers (since replaced by the National Police Chiefs’ Council), is comprised of 
senior policing staff from across the country, and is responsible for coordinating policing in the UK.  
5 Now called the Department for Education. 
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street gang, using inappropriate language in school’; ‘[e]xpression of far right racist views’; 
‘[g]raffiti in school books supporting violent extremism’; ‘[p]ossession of a video on a mobile 
phone, showing a beheading’; ‘[a]ggressive behaviour towards fellow students and 
disrespectful behaviour to staff particularly towards female members of staff’; ‘[d]rug use by 
a school pupil who was a religious convert and had insecure family relationships’; ‘[a] 
student with mental health issues who associated with others who held extremist views’; 
and ‘[a] strong desire to possess guns and knives and be part of a gang’ (ACPO, 2009: 34; see 
also ACPO, 2012). 
 
Similarly, DCSF guidance provided ‘recent examples’ that had arisen in schools. These 
included: pupils bringing ‘far-right literature encouraging violence towards a local ethnic 
community’ into school; a primary age pupil ‘talking about the “duty of all true Muslims to 
prepare for jihad war as we grow up” and talks of the ‘7/7 martyrs’ with admiration’; and a 
supply teacher leaving a book in the school library which stated ‘“that seeking to be killed 
and pursuing martyrdom are legitimate and praiseworthy acts”’ (DCSF, 2008a: 35). Lastly, 
the following three examples are given as ‘concerns’ that had arisen in colleges: the ‘college 
is approached by a group of students who find that the local mosques do not provide 
enough scope for them to discuss and debate particular topical issues that relate to religious 
ideology and how they can apply their understanding of their faith within the modern world. 
They want to set up a society where they can do this’; ‘an individual has been seeking to 
access an Arabic website that is not on the agreed list’ and ‘a report that a student is 
upsetting other students by challenging their clothing as un-Islamic and encouraging them 
not to mix with non-Muslims’ (DCSF, 2008b: 28). 
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One of the examples that recurs, and was quoted earlier, is that of a young adult writing 
extremist graffiti in an exercise book. Its appearance as an example across these guidance 
documents is most likely due to the case of Hasib Hussain, one of the 7/7 bombers. 
Described by Norman Bettison (who, at the time, was responsible for Prevent within ACPO) 
as a ‘model student’ who had never come to the police’s attention prior to the attacks, it 
was found that his school exercise books were full of supportive references to al-Qaeda. As 
Norman Bettison goes on to state in his evidence to the Communities and Local 
Government Committee: 
To write in one’s exercise book is not criminal and would not come on the radar of 
the police, but the whole ethos, the heart of Prevent is the question for me of 
whether someone in society might have thought it appropriate to intervene. What 
do I mean by intervention? I do not mean kicking his door down at 6 o’clock in the 
morning and hauling him before the magistrates. I mean should someone have 
challenged that? They are the sorts of cases that get referred through the Channel 
scheme (Communities and Local Government Committee, 2010: 17). 
 
Taken as a strategy of (in)visibilisation, what Bettison is thus insisting upon is the need to 
attune the gaze of relevant professionals to such signs, to enable intervention prior to 
radicalisation. The effect of these examples and indicators is to affirm that vulnerabilities 
towards radicalisation existed, but were not necessarily made visible. As Channel training 
produced by the College of Policing states, staff ‘who are already supporting vulnerable 
people […] see signs but don’t always realise what they could indicate’ (College of Policing & 
Metropolitan Police Service, 2014). Put another way, the signs of potential (violent) 
extremism were available, but were not integrated into an accurate visualisation of threat, 
not seen, or at least, were not seen for what they were. ‘Vulnerability indicators’ seek to 
reshape the interpretative lenses through which agents responsible for security see and 
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perceive the world. If, prior to Prevent, graffiti in a notebook went unnoticed, the priority of 
Prevent is to ensure that it is visibilised as a key site of knowledge and gaze.  
 
These indicators do not merely exist in policy guidance, but are crucially the basis for 
training and professional development that are, increasingly, mandated for millions of 
workers who fall within the statutory obligation of the Prevent duty. Training programmes 
such as WRAP are now a core part of the professional lives of, for instance, teachers, social 
workers and healthcare practitioners (see Home Office, 2014). This new role has been 
contested. Professional organisations such as the National Union of Teachers and the Royal 
College of Psychiatrists have been deeply critical of the duties members of their professions 
are expected to enact (Adams, 2016; Royal College of Psychiatrists, 2016). However, now 
that Prevent is a statutory duty, failure to comply can result in significant censure, including 
direct state intervention in the failing institution. Potential strategies and tactics of 
resistance are beyond the scope of this paper, but it is clear there are institutional pressures 
to report. This may go some way to explaining the decreased number of referred cases that 
go on to receive a Channel intervention. As discussed earlier, prior to the 31st March 2014, 
20% of referrals received support within Channel, compared to 5% in the 2015/16 reporting 
year. Put differently, the threat of censure across a range of responsibilised professions may 
be leading to the over-reporting of signs of ‘vulnerability’. 
 
The Channel process thus reveals key aspects of how indicators as a security technology 
enable the (in)visibilisation of threat. When this paper talks of the visibilisation and 
illumination of ‘vulnerability’, it is not merely metaphor, but an articulation of the (no doubt 
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always contested and unfinished) attempt by state actors to transmit to pastoral 
professionals a particular economy of visibility that enables the accurate visualisation of the 
potentially threatening subject – in this case that subject who may go on to be radicalised. 
Reflecting on the significant increases in Channel referrals, these would suggest such 
training is successful in getting professionals to interpret their practice anew, spotting, what 
are at least interpreted as, signs of vulnerability to radicalisation. It is an active strategy of 
(in)visibilisation that seeks to produce an economy of the gaze that draws attention to 
some, and diverts attention from others. Certain individuals, by virtue of their behaviours, 
are illuminated; others, in not being indicated, are invisibilised and produced as secure. Yet 
such production is necessarily political – seeking to direct the gaze in concrete and specific 
ways. It is to the politics of this strategy of (in)visibilisation that the paper now turns. 
 
The Politics of Channel 
 
The framing of radicalisation within a context of vulnerability positions pastoral agencies at 
the forefront of identifying individuals who might benefit from a Channel intervention. In so 
doing, there is a clear intent to mobilise a pre-existing pastoral gaze, already attuned to 
particular sites of knowledge. This reliance upon the professions has grown over time within 
the policy and mobilises the duty of care they possess to their subjects. In CONTEST 3, 
resources were shifted from local community providers to these specified authorities. The 
key rationale of the shift is that it draws parallels between counter-radicalisation work and 
other issues of safeguarding, thereby invoking Channel as an intervention of care (see 
Heath-Kelly, 2017b; Ragazzi, 2017). The process of preventing the vulnerable from the risks 
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posed by extremist thought is understood as analogous to protecting the vulnerable from 
drug or alcohol dependency, or from engaging in criminality or gang-based violence. As the 
WRAP training clearly states to relevant professionals:  
 
You may not know it, but you’re integral to Prevent’s success: because you already 
have the skills and support to hand that can recognise when someone may be 
becoming involved in or supporting terrorism, and can help them make a decision 
not to carry on that path, before any crime is committed (WRAP 2014: 1). 
 
The identification of vulnerability is taken to be a generalised skill, of which many are 
already experts, and into which the specific knowledges concerning vulnerability to 
radicalisation can be integrated. The training goes so far as to state that, ‘we don’t need to 
understand the ideologies or ideas that are promoted, more the way they work to hook in 
the vulnerable’ (WRAP, 2014: 2). What is thus invoked is a conception of an already existent 
pastoral gaze, attuned to sensing, seeing and managing vulnerability. 
 
However, this does not entail that Channel represents a politics of care to the exclusion of 
questions of ideology, and the racialised and Muslimified politics of identity this brings in. As 
a strategy of (in)visibilisation, the question must also be, who is illuminated? And what 
properties are rendered intelligible as signs of potential future terrorism? In this regard, 
while the training documentation is at pains to point out that signs of vulnerability to 
radicalisation are generic, attention to the indicators discussed previously allows a reading 
of the politics of identity which they work to (in)visibilise. It stands out that in many of the 
examples, there is merely an expression, perhaps verbal, perhaps communicated in images, 
of a politics or religiosity. It is in this context that anti-Christian, anti-Semitic or anti-Muslim 
words and behaviour, expressing racist views and accessing extremist websites can be 
understood. It is also within this framing that concern around a group of Muslim students 
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wishing to debate politics and theology outside of their local mosque can be situated. These 
political and theological expressions are now an intimate security concern. Moreover, it 
clearly raises questions over who judges 'extremism' and where the line is drawn. For 
instance, take the example of a supply teacher bringing extremist material into college, 
which the police aim to help with by assessing its legality and then taking protective actions 
(ACPO, 2012: 23). On the one hand, this demands an extra layer of mediating, with 
colleagues having to judge whether the material might be extreme, thus warranting further 
police guidance. On the other, it brings in questions of expertise and judgement over the 
constitution of the boundary of that which is or is not 'extreme'.  
 
These are the concrete instantiations of the ‘extreme’ and are intimately related to 
conceptions of ‘Britishness’ and ‘British values’ (see Martin 2014a, 2014b). Extremism is 
defined as ‘vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values, including democracy, 
the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and 
beliefs’ and includes ‘calls for the deaths of members of our armed forces’ (Home Office, 
2011b: 107). Thus, within the ‘vulnerability indicators’ there is a politics of identity and a 
disciplining of the boundaries of ‘Britishness’. Harm for the future is produced as 
significations of threat in the present, embodied by particular subjects. As a discursive 
statement of threat, those who are seen to be opposed to British values, and not 
containable within a normalised account of ‘Britishness’ are illuminated, situated as risky. 
Those seen to cohere, to ascribe to normalised categories of ‘Britishness’ are invisibilised 
within this context, not necessitating attention. 
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Channel’s vulnerability indicators thus cannot be understood outside of a context in which 
question of ‘extremism’, ‘Britishness’ and ‘British values’ are already invested with a 
substantive identity politics. This is particularly the case for racialised minorities in the UK, 
and specifically for subjects who would identify as, or be perceived as, Muslim. These 
questions of inclusion have long colonial and post-colonial histories. For the purposes of this 
paper though, it is enough to recognise that within the context of the ‘War on Terror’, 
Muslim-ness has been represented as potentially threatening and not necessarily in 
coherence with ‘Britishness’ (Richards, 2011). To give but one example: in response to the 
attacks in France at the beginning of 2015, the Secretary of State for Communities and Local 
Government sent a letter to Muslim organisations, intended to reassure them in the face of 
potential hostility, and ask them to continue to reject extremism in their communities 
(Pickles and Ahmed, 2015). Yet, as the Muslim Council of Britain pointed out (Wintour, 
2015), the letter makes certain implicit and problematic assumptions, stating that, ‘[y]ou, as 
faith leaders, are in a unique position in our society. You have a precious opportunity, and 
an important responsibility: in explaining and demonstrating how faith in Islam can be part 
of British identity’ (Pickles and Ahmed, 2015, emphasis added). Islam is positioned as 
continuously needing to establish an inclusion; its coherency within ‘British identity’ is never 
quite proven, always requiring work, continuing a legacy of representing Muslimness as in 
tension with a normalised Britishness (Sobolewska, 2010; Gutkowski, 2011). While 
strategies of (in)visibilisation seek to produce regimes of (in)visibility, this necessarily 
intersects with a pre-existing distribution of the gaze and objects and subjects of knowledge. 
Thus, there is a statement of vulnerability (the extremist, those opposing British values) 
alongside a regime of visibility (governing who and what is seen, perceptions of identity, 
difference and threat). Pastoral frameworks of care and vulnerability are thus mobilised 
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alongside a distribution of the gaze in which Muslimified subjects are more likely to be 
viewed as external to ‘British values’ and as threatening.  
 
In de Vries’ (2016: 876) account of the politics of (in)visibility with regard to refugee 
populations in Malaysia, she emphasises the ‘play’ of visibility within, what she terms, a 
context of ‘governance-resistance’. Subjects are not merely the objects of visibilisation, but 
are attuned to the rules of the game, and are able to act tactically in relation to regimes of 
(in)visibility (de Vries, 2016: 889). While resistance to the operations of Channel per se is 
beyond the scope of this paper, it is worth recognising the agency with which Muslimified 
subjects negotiate these regimes of (in)visibility as a site of (in)visibility. Academic research 
is emerging that points to such negotiations. Mythen et al. (2012) provide interview 
evidence from young British Muslims of the changes to behaviour and appearance they 
enact in response to British counter-terrorism policies. They provide qualitative data 
showing how their Muslim respondents are very much aware of the visibilities that are seen 
to signify risk. They talk of the need to modify how they present their religiosity and politics, 
such as by concealing their beards, out of a fear that such performances might be 
misinterpreted and could lead to suspicion (Mythen et al., 2012, p. 393; see also Brown and 
Saeed, 2015). These practices point to the intimate relationship between statements of 
values and extremism and visibilised and embodied spaces of identity, belonging and 
perceived threat. The language of ‘extremism’ that permeates the indicators and the 
discourses of Channel is not neutral, but folds back upon existing distributions of the gaze 
and sites of knowledge. This reading of the politics of (in)visibility helps explain the 
comparatively high number of referrals for ‘Islamist extremism’, and also, perhaps, the 
significant number of referrals which do not go on to receive a Channel intervention. It 
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speaks to pre-existing regimes of threat, which serve to render certain subjects visible as 
more threatening than others, regimes that do not necessarily cohere with the specific 
concerns of radicalisation that Channel panel members are looking for (yet which are, 
nevertheless, inscribed through guidance and training documents).   
 
Nevertheless, while they fold back on pre-existing regimes of (in)visibility, vulnerability 
indicators are also, and crucially, productive. They produce novel sites of visibility at the 
intersection of identity and the pastoral, bringing together an analysis of ‘vulnerability’ and 
‘extremism’ that situates them as intimately connected to conceptions of ‘Britishness’ and 
its risky exterior (see also Heath-Kelly, 2017a). The politics of care folds back on Channel’s 
politics of identity. Existing safeguarding risks, visibilities and proficiencies come to play in 
the economy of visibilities that informs vulnerability to radicalisation. These indicators are 
not necessarily seen as factors in and of themselves, but are frequently linked to particular 
'extreme' identities or behaviours. In so doing, ‘generic’ welfare issues become religiously, 
politically and culturally inscribed. So, returning to some of the examples and indicators 
listed earlier, drug use and insecure family ties may require care and support of some 
nature, but it would seem the reason for this being a vulnerability demanding a counter-
radicalisation framing is that the individual is a religious convert. Likewise, examples are 
given of someone with mental health issues associating with others who are deemed to 
hold extremist views and of a religious convert, who had also joined a street gang, using 
inappropriate language in school. It must be assumed that problematic language has been a 
concern at schools prior to Prevent guidance. Yet here, alongside religiosity, it is presented 
as a threat indicator that teachers should be aware of specifically in terms of a potentially 
latent propensity to violent extremism. Channel produces newly visibilised sites of 
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knowledge – the drug-using religious convert, a subject with mental health concerns 
associating with those deemed to hold extremist views. Existing vulnerabilities are inscribed 
within a system of light that – when conjoined with questions of identity, ‘Britishness’ and 
extremism – sees them as potential signs of future violence. It should thus be no surprise 
that, for the reporting year 2015/16, 50% of referred individuals were signposted to other 
support mechanisms rather than being progressed to a Channel panel; only 14% of all 
referrals were discussed at a panel (Home Office, 2017: 4). At the intersection of a politics of 
care and a politics of identity, this speaks to the complex space in which professionals are 
now expected to operate, and in which decisions to refer, or not, are made. Channel is 
productive of its own gaze.  
 
In asking pastoral professionals to watch out for ‘extremism’, and indeed, to judge just what 
that extremism looks like, Channel is making new demands of such professionals. The 
textual relation of specific concerns, such as mental health, drug use, poor behaviour, 
alongside associations with extremism, that are found in guidance and training documents, 
visibilises them in new ways. Such longstanding concerns are reframed. And, in the context 
of the politics of identity mobilised through Channel, is likely to visibilise racialised and 
Muslimified subjects at this new intersection of care and security. It is a structuring of the 
economy of the gaze to focus on certain subjects and not others. It at once mobilises an 
existing gaze while also producing new sites of knowledge that carry their own economy of 
(in)visibility. 
 
Conclusion 
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Four conclusions can be drawn from the above analysis. First, it is hoped that this paper has 
directed an attentiveness towards the mechanisms through which security regimes are, at 
least at times, constituted through strategies of (in)visibilisation. It has been argued that, 
beyond, but often mobilised through, the discursive, security regimes also operate through 
producing an optics of that which is risky, requiring securing, and that which is not. These 
function as economies, illuminating certain sites and not others, directing the gaze of 
security actors, and producing newly visibilised subjects, objects and processes that are 
deemed threatening. The paper thus extends and clarifies the increasing scholarly concern 
with security visualities, pushing the debate beyond the study of visual artefacts (important 
as this is), towards the production of the visible itself. In so doing, it is hoped this paper 
provides a starting point for thinking through how certain subjects are visualised and made 
visible as sites of risk, and how this illumination functions within an economy of attention 
and gaze. 
 
Second, Channel, this paper has argued, only makes sense when understood as a strategy of 
(in)visibilisation. Beyond critiques that see Prevent as a technology for producing and 
governing individuals (Heath-Kelly, 2013, de Goede and Simon, 2013) and critiques that 
situate Prevent as productive of suspect communities (Pantazis and Pemberton, 2009; 
Breen-Smyth, 2014), this analysis demonstrates that a crucial facet of Prevent is that it seeks 
to structure the gaze of millions of professionals who possess a duty to maintain vigilance 
for signs of vulnerability. It demands an attentiveness to extremism, and the politics of 
identity that brings with it, into the day-to-day life of pastoral-security professionals. It is a 
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regime of (in)visibility that, structured by knowledges of radicalisation that invoke a linear 
temporality, situates the security problematic of becoming (dangerous) at the heart of the 
pastoral gaze. And in so doing, it goes beyond the politics of individual interventions. What 
is at stake within Channel are new lines of sight, new subjects of visibility, new distributions 
of the sensible. At the heart of the Channel process is a demand to restructure the gaze of 
pastoral professionals towards new threats. It is a desire to transform how millions of public 
sector workers see and engage with their environments.  
 
Third, the gaze that Channel constitutes, while framed as apolitical, solely concerned with 
safeguarding, is invested with politics. It is a gaze that must integrate concerns of 
vulnerability and care, and those of extremism, values and ‘Britishness’, producing new 
subjects of risk, amenable to both gaze and mediation. Vulnerability indicators, 
communicated through the training of pastoral professionals represent a key site of 
production of particular visibilities (the vulnerable, the extreme, those opposed to ‘British 
values’) and invisibilities (those who are seen to cohere, and are thus unseen). In so doing, 
Channel institutes its own boundary. Not coterminous with the law, nor the territoriality of 
the state, it mobilises perceived lack of coherence to vague ascriptions of ‘Britishness’ and 
‘British values’ as signifiers of threat, folding onto both existing racialised regimes of risk and 
pastoral regimes of care. It inscribes a novel economy. Navigating the intersections of a 
politics of care and a politics of identity, it produces and communicates a novel border, 
demarcating the secure from those now requiring mediation. This has concrete 
consequences for the expression of identity. In its preclusive demand, performances of 
certain identities are now part of an amalgam of risk indicators to which professional gazes 
must be attuned. Thus, it becomes the visible, performative expression of such values, ideas 
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and ideals that signify risk. In essence, it is the performance that becomes intolerable, and 
thus, a whole range of legal political or religious expressions become subject to novel 
interventions.  
  
Fourth, Channel thus represents an at once coherent and yet deeply troubling merging of a 
politics of care with a politics of identity. As Ragazzi (2017:167-170) has rightly identified, 
the Prevent strategy marks a key move towards the integration of social policy within a 
security framework. Within the context of the pastoral-security gaze produced within 
Channel, what further emerges is a novel ambition that seeks to embed security at the heart 
of everyday social relations (see also Heath-Kelly, 2017a). If, part of the human condition is 
change over time – of becoming – then the promise held by Channel is that, with the right 
training, becoming that is becoming dangerous can be made visible in the present, can be 
identified, and, ultimately, can be mediated before such danger manifests. Channel can thus 
be read as a strategy of (in)visibilisation at the forefront of visibilising life itself as a process 
of (potentially dangerous) becoming. It is the frontline of a profound merging of a politics of 
care and a politics of identity, enabling new subjects and objects of risk to be identified, and 
with significant implications for our understanding of how contemporary life must be 
secured. 
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